Against all Odds
The Politics of Denial: Lessons from a Masterby Kathleen Cravero
So why was the Code such a hot-button topic for UNICEF and what did it have to do with me?
Here’s how it went down:
From the outset, the US government, representing the interests of breastmilk substitute manufacturers (including the infamous Nestle) was dead set against the Code. A high-profile USAID official (Stephen Joseph) resigned over the US position – and Jim Grant hired him as a senior advisor. Perhaps Mr. Grant thought that Stephen could be a bridge between the US government and the UN – and increasingly strident NGO advocates. But the US only hardened its position. Veiled (and not so veiled) threats related to funding continued, as did criticism of UNICEF’s “radical” position on the Code.
WHO also seemed caught up in corporate interests. The senior WHO staff engaged with the issue were pushing for delays, compromise and watered-down provisions. The NGOs were getting angry. UNICEF was caught in the middle. Mr. Grant knew that UNICEF had to be on the right side of history in promoting the Code. But he also knew that he couldn’t lose the financial or political support of the US government.
At the time this was happening, I was a P2 working with Jack Charnow and Sheila Barry in the Office of the Executive Board. My main job was to support the NGO Committee on UNICEF, a group of child- and health-focused NGOs that met regularly to promote both UNICEF and child-related causes. The NGOs promoting the Code, led by the Infant Formula Action Coalition (INFACT), were different. INFACT was not interested in briefings with UNICEF officials or advance copies of UNICEF reports. It wanted UNICEF to voice clear and unambivalent support for the strongest-possible Code. INFACT members were smart, energetic and determined. By default I ended up dealing with these relentless activists in New York, while Marjorie Newman-Williams, my counterpart in Geneva, was fending them off in Europe.
Stephen Joseph attended the October 1979 meeting and put on record UNICEF’s support for a strong Code. This brought down the wrath of both the US government and the big corporations. Stephen Joseph was a celebrity at this point. There was no way he could take a position that was not seen as coming straight from Jim Grant’s office. It was then that Jim Grant decided that he needed negotiators so junior, so young, and so obviously out of the decision-making loop that they (1) couldn’t possibly have direct access to him and (2) could credibly be seen to be off-the-rails in siding with Code advocates.
So that’s how Marjorie Newman-Williams and I became UNICEF’s “chief negotiators” for the Code. Over the next several months, guided by late night calls with Stephen Joseph, we represented UNICEF at high-level meetings, met with civil society groups across the spectrum and battled with WHO. WHO officials were incredulous that we were in charge – and quickly grew furious at the positions we took. One of the WHO leads told us we were ruining our careers and I was reminded many times of the risks of “disregarding” the interests of my country and UNICEF’s biggest donor. We were told that Mr. Grant had been informed of our reckless behavior and would call to set us straight. The call never came. We carried on – and the Code was adopted by the World Health Assembly in January 1981, with only one country (the US) voting against it.
I don’t remember any formal de-briefing with Mr. Grant. I only remember him passing by my office and remarking: “You two really stirred things up over there, didn’t you?” Then he winked and walked away.
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